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Comments and Casenotes
THE MARYLAND CLASSIFIED INCOME TAX OF 1939'
By CALEB R. KELLY, JR.*
The question whether the Maryland Income Tax Act
of 19392 shall be radically modified appears likely to rank
as one of the most important items on the agenda of the
1941 Session of the General Assembly. Few statutes have
been more sharply criticized,3 and yet those responsible for
I Articles appearing in prior issues of the Maryland Law Review have
discussed in detail various phases of Maryland income tax law. Thus,
the history of income taxation in Maryland and the constitutionality of
the "flat" income tax (imposed by Chapter 11 of the Acts of the 1937
Special Session of the Maryland Legislature) were considered in Cairns,
History and Constitutionality of the Maryland Income Tax Law (1937)
2 Md. L. Rev. 1. The same issue contained a survey of the "flat" income
tax law, Carter, A Survey of the Maryland Income Tax Law (1938) 2
Md. L. Rev. 11. The taxation of Maryland ground rents was fully con-
sidered in Lewis. The Taxation of Maryland Ground Rents (1939) 3 Md.
L. Rev. 314. Several sections of that article were devoted to a dis-
cussion of the effect of the 1939 Classified Income Tax on ground rents.
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A. B., 1933, Johns Hopkins University;
LL. B., 1938, University of Maryland School of Law.
2"Md. Code (1939) Art. 81, Secs. 222-258, enacted by Md. Laws 1939,
Ch. 277.
8 The criticisms leveled at this taxing statute may be conveniently
divided into two categories:
First, it is contended that the voters of the State rejected the income
tax as a means of raising State revenue when, in November, 1938, they
refused to approve an Amendment to Article 15 of the Declaration of
Rights of the Constitution of Maryland (submitted to the voters of the
State under Chapter 525 of the 1937 Acts of the Maryland Legislature)
which would have added to that Article the following provision:
"Taxes may be imposed on incomes, which may be classified, grad-
uated and progressive and the exemption of a reasonable amount of
income from taxation may be provided and such taxes may be in lieu
of taxes on any class or classes of real or personal property as the
General Assembly may determine."
It is further contended that the enactment of any new form of income
tax in direct opposition to the expressed will of the voters cannot, under
any circumstances, be justified, and that the enactment of an income tax
under such circumstances constituted a violent transgression of demo-
cratic principles. The Commission on Taxation and Revenue (commonly
known as the Rawls Commission because it was headed by William Lee
Rawls), although it was the originator of the Classified Income Tax for
Maryland, recognized this objection to the enactment of a new form of
income tax (page 4 of the Report of the Commission, dated January 25th,
1939) :
"The point was raised at the outset that reasons of expediency
should dictate the abandonment of this revenue source, because of the
adverse vote upon the proposed constitutional amendment (Ch. 525,
Acts of 1937). The vote may be explained by the fear on the part
of taxpayers that a favorable vote might have brought about the
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the form of the levy are warm in their praise of it, and
are confident that they have established a permanent form
of taxation for the State of Maryland.4 It is admitted even
by this group, however, that certain modifications are in
order.'
Highlights of the Classified Income Tax Law
Under the Maryland Income Tax Law of 1939, which
became effective on April 13th, 1939, the taxes imposed are
to be levied annually.' The first return and tax payment
for those whose accounting period is the calendar year was
due on or before March 15th, 1940.7  At that time the tax
was payable on income received or accrued during the
calendar year 1939.8 Those whose taxable year is a fiscal
year9 are required to file returns on or before the fifteenth
day of the third month following the close of their fiscal
year,10 and the income taxable to such persons during the
adoption of a graduated or progressive income tax of an extreme
character. The tax we recommend is a uniform income tax, classified
as to source of income."
Second, it is contended that no matter how much reasons of expediency
may have dictated the adoption of a new form of income tax for the
State of Maryland, the 1939 Act, as enacted and enforced, creates such
hardships and contains so many ambiguous and discriminatory provisions
that it should be either radically modified or repealed in toto. Many of
the specific criticisms of the Act are hereinafter discussed.
It is interesting to note that the violent criticisms of the State Income
Tax Law of 1939 did not appear, except in isolated instances, until early
in 1940 when the taxpayers of the State were first confronted with the
filing of returns and the payment of taxes under the Act. At that time
massmeetings protesting the Act were held throughout the State, and at
least one taxpayers' league (The Taxpayers' Relief Association, Inc.) was
founded to fight the tax both in the courts and in the Legislature.
'Attorney-General William C. Walsh made statements to this effect in
his oral argument before Judge O'Dunne, who presided in the Circuit
Court of Baltimore City at the hearing of the consolidated cases of Culver
v. Tawes and Oursler v. Tawes, discussed infra circa n. 38. These state-
ments were repeated by the Attorney-General in his oral argument be-
fore the Court of Appeals. The Rawls Commission on page 3 of its Re-
port said:
"Moreover, the Commission believes that this tax . . . Is sound
in theory, and, regardless of the needs of the moment must form a
permanent part of the tax structure of the State."
5 See Article in defense of the Maryland Classified Income Tax by H.
H. Walker Lewis in the Evening Sun, April 30th, 1940. See also state-
ments of the Governor of the State quoted in the Morning Sun, March 6th,
1940.
6 Md. Code (1939) Art 81, Sec. 230.
1 Ibid., Secs. 233, 245.
8 Sec. 233 does not use the words "or accrued" during the year 1939,
but it is evident from the rest of the Act that a taxpayer whose books are
kept on an accrual basis was liable to be taxed on income accrued during
the calendar year 1939. See Sec. 226.
9 Sec. 222 (h).
10 Sec. 245.
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first taxable year was such proportion of the income of the
entire fiscal year as the number of days remaining in the
fiscal year after January 1st, 1939 bore to three hundred
and sixty-five days, with the proviso, however, to the effect
that if the taxpayer's records disclosed the exact income
for that part of the fiscal year falling in the year 1939,
then the portion of the fiscal year's income received or ac-
crued during the calendar year 1939 was taxable." If a
taxpayer makes a Federal return his income must be com-
puted for the purpose of the Maryland tax on the same
calendar or fiscal year therein shown.' 2
The rate of the tax for individuals, defined in the Act
as "all natural persons" and also "all fiduciaries, including
corporate fiduciaries and the estates they represent", 13 is
2V2% on "ordinary income" and 6% on "investment in-
come". 14 "Ordinary income" is defined by the Act as "that
portion of the gross income which is not investment in-
come"."' "Investment income" is defined by the Act as
"that portion of the gross income which is derived from
dividends,' ground rents,'17 annuity income," and inter-
est,"' 9 other than certain allowable business interest ex-
emptions.20 The rate of the tax for corporations, other
than those that are exempted from the provisions of the
Act, is 11/2 % regardless of whether the income is ordinary
or investment in character.2' Corporations are taxable
only on such portion of their net income as is allocable to
the State of Maryland under special provisions relating to
such allocation set forth in the Act.22 Partnerships as such
are not required to pay a tax,23 but they must file informa-
tion returns,24 and the partners are liable for tax on their
respective portions of the partnership income in their indi-
vidual capacities.
All individuals who are either single, or married but
separated, are required to file returns where their net in-
"' Sec. 233.
12 Sec. 226(c).13 Sec. 222(e).
1 See. 230(a).
15 Sec. 222(o).
1 Defined in Sec. 222(j).
1 Defined in See. 222(k)
"1 Defined in Sec. 222(1).
"Defined in See. 222(m).
"Sec. 222(n).
21 Certain corporations are exempted. See See. 230(b).
22 Sec. 230(b) . See Sec. 253 which defines the Income allocable to the
State of Maryland.
Sec. 252.
"Sec. 238.
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come for the taxable year exceeds one thousand dollars or
their gross income exceeds five thousand dollars, and those
who are married and living with husband or wife must file
returns if their combined net income exceeds two thousand
dollars or their combined gross income exceeds five thou-
sand dollars. Any individual, or husband and wife living
together, whose investment income for the taxable year
exceeds two hundred dollars also must file a return. Fidu-
ciaries must file returns where the net income or the gross
investment income exceeds two hundred dollars or where
the gross income exceeds five thousand dollars.25 All non-
exempt corporations having any income allocable to the
State of Maryland must file returns.26 Non-resident indi-
viduals must file returns when they have received income
taxable to them under the Act in the same amounts as
provided for resident individuals 27
Personal exemptions are provided for in the Act2 but
these personal exemptions actually amount to tax credits
rather than personal exemptions as the words are gen-
erally understood. Thus a single person or married person
not living with husband or wife receives a tax credit of
$25.00; the head of a family or married person living with
husband or wife receives a tax credit of $50.00; an addi-
tional tax credit of $10.00 is allowed for each person de-
pendent upon and receiving his chief support from the tax-
payer if the dependent is under eighteen years of age or is
incapable of self-support because mentally or physically
defective; a fiduciary receives a tax credit of $5.00.29
The Act sets out certain items which shall be excluded
from gross income.30 In addition, the Act provides for the
allowance of certain deductions. 1 Much of the criticism
of the Act has arisen as a result of the manner in which
these deductions are computable where the chief source of
the taxpayer's income is investment in character. Whereas
Section 224 of the Act states in absolute terms that certain
deductions (as therein listed) shall be allowed, by the
method of computation of the tax (as provided in Section
25 Sec. 234.
36 Sec. 235.
27 Sec. 234. Except non-resident fiduciaries.
28 Sec. 228.
29 Secs. 228 and 230. Actually Sec. 228 lists the exemptions as such,
but when the tax is computed as provided for in Sec. 230 the exemptions
do not exist but a mere tax credit results. See Sec. 229 for non-resident
exemptions.
80 See Sec. 223.
3" See Sec. 224. See also Sec. 225 for those items not deductible.
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230 of the Act) these deductions are allowed only partially
when applied against investment income. In other words,
a taxpayer whose income is entirely from investment
sources is compelled to pay a tax of 3 % on all deductions
that may be granted him absolutely by Section 224 of the
Act (since he is allowed to deduct only 2/2 % of the amount
of these deductions, whereas his tax has been computed
at a 6% rate). The result of this method of calculation
and of the tax credit rather than the exemption system is
that as to investment income the tax imposed is gross in
nature, rather than net as stated in Section 230 of the
Act.3 2 Thus, a taxpayer, whose sole income for 1939 con-
sisted of $1,000.00 from ground rents, and who was com-
pelled to pay out $50.00 to collect these rents (deductible
under Section 224(m) ) and $50.00 in taxes (deductible un-
der Section 224(c)), and who gave away $50.00 to public
charities (deductible under Section 224 (k) ), would be com-
pelled to compute the tax by taking 6% of $1,000.00 and
then deducting only 21 % of the $150.00 worth of deduc-
tions allowed.
Another provision of the Act which has given rise to
much criticism springs from this same method of computa-
tion when applied to a trust. Under the Act, a taxpayer,
who is the beneficiary of a trust and who has received
taxable investment income from that trust, must compute
his tax at 6% on the amount of the beneficiary's share of
the gross taxable income received by the trustee (not the
gross taxable income actually received by the taxpayer)."
A tax credit, computed at the 21/2% rate is allowed the
taxpayer on the amount deducted by the trustee for taxes,
trustees' commissions, and other administrative expenses.
The result of this method of computation is that such a tax-
payer is compelled to pay a 31/2 % tax on that part of the
monies received by the trustee and used to defray these
expenses of administration, monies in which such a tax-
payer has no right, title or interest.3 4 There is consider-
able doubt as to whether this particular feature of the
32 This particular feature of the Act has been most vehemently denounced
by the opponents of the Act. In his argument before Judge O'Dunne. Mr.
Arthur Machen (who participated as amicus curiae) stated that if it
had not been for the high elmratter of the men composing the Rawls
Commission he would have considered the Act to have been "conceived
in fraud" and "executed in iniquity". (See oral opinion of Judge O'Dunne,
Baltimore Daily Record. March 2, 1940).
11 See Secs. 230 and 251.
34 Since most trusts contain express provisions that the income beneficia-
ries shall not have any right, title or interest in the income from the
trust until these expenses are paid.
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Act, as applied to non-resident trustees and resident bene-
ficiaries, is constitutional. 5
The Act contains a further unusual provision. It is
stipulated 6 that "no tax imposed under the provisions of
this sub-title on any person with respect to ground rent re-
ceived by him, shall be collected from the lessee by the
lessor, and any agreement, express or implied, entered into
by a lessor and a lessee providing for the payment of such
tax by the lessee shall be void". 7
Classified Income Tax Constitutional
The validity of the Maryland Classified Income Tax was
questioned for the first time in the courts in February,
1940, when two cases (later consolidated) were filed under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 7k in the Circuit
Court of Baltimore City.
In the first of these cases (Oursler, et al., v. Tawes), the
facts respecting the situation of the taxpayers as set forth
in the bill of complaint were that the complainants were
husband and wife and had resided in the City of Baltimore
during the year 1939; that during said year they had re-
ceived either jointly or individually income classifiable
under the Act as ordinary income in the amount of $1,766.22
(net income from business and rents from dwellings) and
income classifiable under the Act as investment income
in the amount of $1,762.92 (ground rents and interest from
mortgages); and that under the provisions of the Act the
complainants were compelled to pay a tax computed at the
rate of 2 % on their ordinary income and 6% on their
investment income, less a credit of 2 % on their personal
exemption of $2,000.00.
In the second of these cases (Culver v. Tawes), the bill
of complaint set forth that the complainant had been a
resident of the City of Baltimore during the year 1939;
that during said year he had received income classifiable
under the Act as ordinary income in the amount of $1,764.18
11 See Adams v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 82 L. Ed. 1368, 58 S. Ct. 913 (1937).
This situation was not directly presented to the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals in the cases hereinafter discussed, but a case involving such a fac-
tual situation is now pending before that body, the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County having held this particular feature of the Act
invalid (Williams v. Tawes).
Sec. 230(c).
8 This survey of certain features of the Maryland Classified Income
Tax Act is not intended to be complete, but merely to give the reader
a bird'seye view of those features of the Act that have been generally
discussed. In comparing the Maryland Income Tax Law with the acts
of other States hereinafter, these points will be stressed.
37a Chapter 294 of the Acts of 1939, Md. Code (1939) Art. 31 A.
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(salary and certain income from fiduciaries) and income
classifiable under the Act as investment income in the
amount of $4,208.82 (certain income from fiduciaries); and
that under the provisions of the Act the complainant was
compelled to pay a tax computed at the rate of 2 % on
his ordinary income and 6% on his investment income,
less a credit of 21/2 % on his personal exemption of $1,000.00
and 2 % of $1,907.15, representing certain deductions al-
lowed by the Act consisting of a charitable contribution,
taxes paid and fiduciary deductions. 8
In both bills of complaint the taxpayers contended that
the Income Tax Act was unconstitutional and void as being
repugnant to the 14th Amendment of the Federal Consti-
tution, and to Articles 15 and 23 of the Declaration of
Rights of the Maryland Constitution, in that the Act was
arbitrary and discriminatory in its classification of prop-
erty, individuals, corporations and income, in that it pro-
vided for the taxing of property and income without the
due process of law, and in that it violated the mandate of
the people as expressed by the popular vote on the pro-
posed amendment to Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights
of the Constitution of Maryland, which would have author-
ized the General Assembly to have imposed taxes on
incomes.
The facts as alleged in the bills of complaint bearing
on the status of the complainants as income taxpayers were
conceded by the Respondent-Comptroller of the Treasury.
It was further stipulated between the parties that one of
the ground rents owned by the Complainants-Oursler was
created by a lease in which it was provided that the de-
mised premises were to be held by the lessee, its successors
and assigns, for the term of 99 years, at an annual rental
of $60.00, over and above all deductions for taxes and
assessments of every kind levied or assessed, on said prem-
ises or the rent issuing therefrom; that this lease contained
a covenant on the part of the lessee and its successors to
pay the lessor the aforesaid rent, taxes and assessments
when legally demandable.
as The income from fiduciaries as set out in the bill of complaint did
not consist of the actual net income received by Culver from the fiduciaries,
but instead, as provided for In the Act, of the total gross income received
by the fiduciaries apportionable to Culver under Section 251 of the Act.
The result was to tax Culver at the rate of 3 % on $1822.01, which amount
was never received as income by Culver and which amount Culver actu-
ally had no right to receive as income until his portion of the commis-
sions, taxes and other administrative expenses had been paid. Thus,
the bill of complaint shows that Culver was compelled to pay an Income
tax of $63.77 on monies which he never received.
1940]
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At the hearing in the lower court on these two consoli-
dated cases, the sole question for decision was whether or
not the 1939 Income Tax Law was valid-all facts having
been stipulated to by the parties-and so almost the entire
hearing39 (which extended for three days) consisted of
arguments by counsel for the parties and the intervenor
and by miscellaneous counsel invited to participate in the
argument as amici curiae by Judge O'Dunne, who presided
at the trial. As the greater part of the State revenue pro-
gram for 1939 and 1940 hinged on the outcome of the case
and as the first income tax returns and payments under
the Act were due in less than three weeks time, the hearing
was well attended both by members of the Bar, irate tax-
payers, and members of the general public. Almost every
possible constitutional objection to the Act was aired.
On March 1st, 1940, Judge O'Dunne handed down an
oral opinion, in which, after extended entertaining remarks
in the usual inimitable O'Dunne style,40 the Court con-
cluded that the presumption was in favor of the constitu-
tionality of the Act, and accordingly ruled that it would
uphold the validity of the Act and "let the responsibility
for its interpretation rest where it properly belongs, on the
Court of Appeals of Maryland.'
On June 12th, 1940, the Maryland Court of Appeals
handed down an opinion 42 affirming the action of the lower
court in sustaining the validity of the State Income Tax
" With the exception of certain preliminary attempts on the part of
counsel for an intervenor to have members of the State Legislature testify,
which attempts were unsuccessful.
40 Following are some samples of these remarks:
"The Legislature giveth, the Legislature taketh away. Blessed be
the name of the Legislature-no matter what you think of the Leg-
islature as you have seen it on the witness stand in the progress of
this trial ......
"Both in the briefs and in arguments runs the reference to the
'poor widow'. . . . The world is not composed of poor widows, nor
do they constitute a large part of the Maryland taxpayers! There
are, of course, some. But against these, there is a long line of rich
widows, 'merry widows' immortalized in song and waltz. There are
bewitching widows, inexplicable widows, demure and dangerous
widows... , gay widows wearing the smiles of triumphant hope over
experience .. "
"Major Mullen, in his wide travel and long experience at the bar has,
in actual captivity, one live specimen of a species of animal now al-
most extinct, known as a 'rent charge'. It resembles a ground rent
as much as a ground hog resembles its shadow, but it is not the
same thing." (Opinion of Judge O'Dunne, Baltimore Daily Record,
March 2, 1940.)
Opinion of Judge O'Dunne, Baltimore Daily Record, March 2, 1940.
42 Oursler v. Tawes, 13 A. (2d) 763 (Md. 1940) ; and Culver v. Tawes,
13 A. (2d) 771 (Md. 1940).
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Act (except as to Section 230 (c) thereof) .42a The language
of this opinion is exceedingly broad and seems to establish
without any doubt one of the major contentions of the
State, that no provision of the State Constitution limits the
kind of an income tax that may be enacted by the State
Legislature (except in as much as Article 23 of the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights43 requires conformity with due
process of law).
Among the great variety of constitutional objections to
the Maryland Income Tax Act urged by counsel for the
complainants and others, many were expressly answered
by the opinion rendered by the Court of Appeals; others
were impliedly answered; some still remain unanswered.
The following analysis of some of the most important ques-
tions presented and the answers rendered by the Court of
Appeals will serve to indicate the scope of this decision:
(1) A primary contention of the Appellee was that the
Court had the power to declare the validity or invalidity
of the Income Tax Law only as applied to the situations
of the taxpayers involved. Conversely, the Appellants
contended that under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act the entire Income Tax Law was before the Court for
review and not merely those sections of the Act affecting
the status of the taxpayer-complainants. It was not dis-
puted that the form of the procedure was proper.
The Court of Appeals did not directly decide whether
it had the power under the Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ments Act to determine the validity or invalidity of the
Income Tax Law as applied to others than the respective
parties to the controversy, but it can be argued from the
fact that the Court saw fit to hold Section 230 (c) of the Act
invalid, that the Court reached the conclusion that it did
have the power in question. Section 230(c) of the Act
provides that no tax imposed on any person with respect
to income from ground rents received by him shall be col-
4 2
a Section 230(c) reads as follows:
"No tax imposed under the provisions of this sub-title on any per-
son with respect to ground rent received by him, shall be collected
from the lessee by the lessor, and any agreement, expressed or implied,
entered into by a lessor and a lessee providing for the payment of
such tax by the lessee shall be void."
41 Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides:
"That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his
freehold liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any
manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but
by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the Land."
The term "Law of the Land" as used in this Article has been construed
to be synonymous with the expression "due process of law" as used in
the Federal Constitution. See NILEs, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 46.
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lected from the lessee by the lessor, and that any agree-
ment entered into between the lessor and the lessee pro-
viding for the payment of such tax by the lessee shall be
void. Whether or not the Appellants-Oursler, as lessors,
are able to collect a certain portion of the income tax they
are compelled to pay the State, from their lessees, at first
blush does not seem to be a justiciable issue in a contro-
versy between a taxpayer and the State. It is possible to
argue from the fact that the Court of Appeals saw fit to
declare Section 230(c) of the Act invalid in this contro-
versy between taxpayers and the State that in a proceed-
ing under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to test
the validity of a statute, the Court is not confined in its
decision to the actual controversy as it applies to the par-
ticular parties but is at liberty to approve or reject each
and every provision of the statute questioned."' On the
other hand, it may be that the Court of Appeals, not find-
ing any constitutional justification for a restriction of this
nature, simply gave vent to its feelings in the form of a
dictum.
(2) A further contention of the Appellee was that the
Maryland Legislature has an inherent power to impose a
tax on incomes and that the only limitation on this power
is such as exists under the due process clause of the Mary-
land Constitution and the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Federal Constitution.45 As opposed to this
contention the Appellants urged the view that Article 15
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights was a constitutional
restriction upon the power of the Maryland Legislature to
impose a tax on incomes.46  The argument of the Appel-
"This would seem to be contrary to the decisions of other states under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. See Annotations in 12 A. L. R.
52, 19 A. L. R. 1124, 50 A. L. R. 42, 68 A. L. R. 110, and 87 A. L. R. 1205.
'4 Page 18, Appellee's Brief. The "due process" clauses of the Federal
Constitution are the 5th and 14th Amendments to that Constitution. The
"equal protection" clause is contained in the 14th Amendment. The "due
process" clause of the Maryland Constitution is Article 23 of the Declara-
tion of Rights. See 8upra, n. 43.
48 Page 30, Appellants' Brief. Article 15 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights provides:
"That the levying of taxes by the poll is grievous and oppressive
and ought to be prohibited; that paupers ought not to be assessed for
the support of the government; that the General Assembly shall, by
uniform rules, provide for separate assessment of land and classifi-
cation and sub-classification of improvements on land and personal
property, as it may deem proper; and all taxes thereafter provided
to be levied by the State for the support of the general State Govern-
ment, and by the counties and by the City of Baltimore for their re-
spective purposes, shall be uniform as to land within the taxing dis-
trict and uniform within the class or sub-class of improvements on
land and personal property which the respective taxing powers may
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lants was based on the theory that "an income tax law of
whatever kind . . . is a tax on property or 'an individual
according to his property'", and accordingly that any in-
come tax law "must comply with that portion of Section
15 dealing with taxes upon real and personal property".
As an alternative theory, Appellants argued that even if
income is not property within the meaning of Article 15 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights, still, "the tax proposed
to be levied is embraced by the last clause of the 15th
Article, and, as a fine, duty or tax of another kind, must
be properly and justly laid, 'which is equivalent to saying
they must be uniform' ,.
The Court of Appeals, in discussing the principles un-
derlying State constitutional limitations, concluded that
independent of the limitations placed upon it by the Fed-
eral Constitution, the right to tax is inherent in a State,
that this right underlies the Constitution of the State and
is not granted by it, and that accordingly unless the State
Constitution prohibits the enactment of a particular form
of tax, the Legislature has the power to enact such a form.4"
In determining its stand on the question of the applica-
tion of Article 15 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to
various forms of tax, the Court of Appeals relied on a
lengthy quotation from Niles on Constitutional Law, the
summarized conclusions of which are: that the last clause
of the 15th Article enlarges the taxing power of the Legis-
lature, and that taxes laid under this enlargement of the
power are not property taxes, but are such taxes as are
levied upon occupations, privileges, contracts and things
of that nature; that as to such taxes the rule of equality
does not apply; that as to property taxes the Legislature is
prohibited from taxing the same individual twice in regard
to the same piece of property, but as to the second class
of taxes there is no limitation laid upon the power of the
Legislature by Article 15, except that such taxes are not
to be laid upon property as such.
Having thus concluded that the Legislature has the in-
herent power to levy an income tax unless expressly pro-
have directed to be subjected to the tax levy; yet fines, duties or taxes
may properly and justly be imposed, or laid, with a political view for
the good government and benefit of the community."
1'7 Page 39, Appellants' Brief.
"Page 51, Appellants' Brief.
"9 The Opinion proceeds with a discussion of the three constitutional
limitations upon the State Legislature: the first, the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution; the second, Article
23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; and the third, Article 15 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
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hibited from so doing by the Maryland Constitution and
that the 15th Article of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
does not place such limitation upon this inherent power,
unless the form of income tax is such as to compel the con-
clusion that the tax is a property tax, the Court of Appeals
is then confronted with the core of the problem,-whether
the classified form of income tax, imposed on gross income
in certain instances, is a property tax.
The Court recognizes that there is a wide division of
opinion among the States of the Union as to whether State
income taxes are to be regarded as property taxes, and
that, though the decisions of appellate courts of other juris-
dictions are helpful in reaching a conclusion in this case,
they are in no way controlling.5"
The opinion of the Court of Appeals does not expressly
align Maryland with either of these two conflicting views,
but, when the Court says: "Giving due force to the indi-
cated inherent power of the Legislature as limited by con-
stitutional provisions, both Federal and State, to which we
have referred, it is our conclusion that the enactment of
Chapter 277 was a valid and constitutional exercise of
legislative authority", it in fact decides either that an
income tax is not a property tax or else that under Article
15 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, as amended by
the Act of 1914, Chapter 390, taxes on propert are re-
quired only to be uniform within the classification, and
that the income taxes levied by Chapter 277 of the Acts of
1939 meet with this requirement. The quotation from
Niles on Maryland Constitutional Law, hereinbefore re-
ferred to,51 tends to show that the Court of Appeals in-
tended to adopt the former of these two conclusions.
(3) The Appellants contended "that the Maryland State
Income Tax is so unreasonable and arbitrary in its classifi-
cations and separate rate schedules, as not to comply with
the essential requirements" 2 of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. 5
3
The Appellee contended that all classifications made by
the Act are reasonable within the constitutional sense.
1o The following states have held income to be property for purposes
of their respective constitutions: Alabama, California, Delaware, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington. Those states hold-
ing income not to be property for purposes of their constitutions are:
Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and South Carolina. A leading
decision of the Supreme Court of interest in this connection is that of
Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 156 U. S. 601, 39 L. Ed. 601 (1895).
61 Supra circa n. 49 ff.
52 Pages 58-59, Appellants' Brief.
13 See supra, n. 45.
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The opinion does not treat specifically the many detailed
objections raised by the Appellants as examples of the un-
reasonableness of the classifications made in the Act, but
instead discusses these objections only in a generalized
way:
"Abstract comparisons in the application of the
many and varied provisions of the Act are urged by
the appellants as establishing inequities in its prac-
tical effect. In some cases, it is submitted that sources
of income accruing from property of one classifica-
tion, are subjected to a greater tax burden than are
sources of income derived from property pertaining to
another and separate classification. . . . This situation,
however, arises not as between taxpayers whose
sources of income or situations are similar in that they
accrue from property of like classification under the
Act; but arises in cases where the sources of income
accrue from property of separate and distinct classifi-
cations under the Act. In other words a taxpayer
whose various sources of income accrue from property
separately classified, is subject to the same tax bur-
dens, exemptions and immunities under the law, as
are incident, respectively to the several property classi-
fications from which his total income accrues.
The opinion concludes this particular phase of the prob-
lem by upholding the unequal exemptions set up by the
Act:
"Nor are criticisms leveled at the inequality of va-
rious exemptions allowable, based as they appear to
be upon the various sources of income and situations
of the respective objects of the tax, in our opinion
well directed. To the contrary it seems too firmly es-
tablished to admit of discussion, that the Legislature
has the power to exempt from taxation any person,
corporation, or class of property according to its views
of public policy or expediency, provided always that
no constitutional provisions are violated .... 154
Thus the Court of Appeals expressly approves all classi-
fications and exemptions made by the Income Tax Law
without discussing directly any of the alleged arbitrary
and discriminatory classifications, except in this most gen-
eral way. The theory of the Court of Appeals, as contained
54 Citing Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U. S. 436, 17 L. Ed. 173
(1861), and Williams-Wilkins Co. v. Baltimore, 103 Md. 293, 63 A. 562
(1906).
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in the quotation from Carmichael, etc., v. Southern Coal
and Coke Co.,5 a is evidently to the effect that in the ab-
sence of a showing that the action of the Legislature was
capricious the courts must presume that the legislation in
question is constitutional, and that without such a show-
ing the presumption is conclusive. Implicit in this express
but general approval of all classifications and exemptions
made by the Act is the conclusion that it was reasonable
for the Legislature to place income from dividends, ground
rents, annuity income, and interest in a different category
from rents other than ground rents, income from patents
and copyrights in the hands of an assignee, and income
of a special partner in a limited partnership.5
(4) It was vigorously contended by Appellants that the
method imposed by Section 230 of the Act in taxing gross
51a 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245 (1937).
"'The critics of the Maryland Act contend that it is most unfair to
tax one class of unearned income at the 6% rate and another class at
the 2 % rate. They reason that, if it is necessary to have two cate-
gories, all income of the unearned character should be in the "investment"
category.
In answer to this contention those favoring the placing of the ground
rent income in the "investment" class justify their action on several
grounds: first, they argue that since mortgage interest was placed in this
category, it would be unfair to the holders of mortgages to place a higher
tax on the income from that type of security than on income from ground
rents; second, they argue that ground rents, as well as the ground from
which they Were derived, escaped taxation to the owners thereof under
the old system of taxation, whereas ordinary rents and the property
from which they were derived, were taxed through the real property
assessments and in order to equalize the tax burden, ground rents should
be surtaxed; third, they argue that ground rents resemble in many ways
bonds and preferred stock, and that since such intangible securities are
surtaxed, ground rents should be surtaxed.
The opponents of the present classification In reply argue that the re-
sult of surtaxing ground rent income Is not to equalize the tax burden
but to discriminate against the ground rent owner:
First, this group contends that there is no justification for making
the distinction between the rate of tax on ground rent income and the
rate of tax on income from ordinary rents. They argue that it is a fal-
lacy to conclude that the ground from which the rent Is issuing is not
taxed simply because the owner of the land has made a contract with
the lessee of the land in which the latter has agreed to pay all taxes
due on the land,-that the lessee simply pays these taxes for the lessor.
The result, they contend, is to tax the ground rent owner in three ways
(property tax on the land, 2'A% tax on the income, and 3 % surtax
on the income), whereas the ordinary rent owner is taxed only twice
(property tax and 2%% income tax). Second, this group contends that
there is no Justification for placing ground rents in the same category
as income from intangible securities, that there is little resemblance be-
tween a ground rent and a bond or preferred stock certificate. They point
out that under the old system of taxation, intangibles were taxed as
property, but that under the 1939 Income Tax Law this property tax
was lifted and the 3 % income surtax was placed on the income derived
from the intangible securities to replace the old property tax. The result,
they argue, was, again to discriminate against the ground rent owner,
since the property tax against him was not removed and both the ordi-
nary 2 % income tax and the 3 % income surtax were placed on him.
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income is particularly objectionable and results, where the
income is investment in character, in an obnoxious form of
double taxation. The Appellee contended that the tax was
not a gross income tax, even as to investment income. 5
The Court of Appeals did not discuss this objection to the
Act.
The theory pursued by Appellants was that although
a tax measured by net income may be an equitable method
of distributing the burdens of State Government among
those privileged to enjoy its benefits, a tax on gross income
finds no support in the economic reasons which sustain
income taxes;51 that such a tax does not indicate the pos-
session of sufficient funds with which to pay the tax and
may result in the levy of an income tax against persons
who have no net income.58 Apparently the Court of Ap-
peals chose to ignore this contention completely in its
opinion.59
(5) Although it was argued by the Appellants that Sec-
tion 230 (c) of the Act, which provides that no tax imposed
on any person with respect to income from ground rents
received by him shall be collected from the lessee by the
lessor and that no agreement to the contrary shall be valid,
was unconstitutional as having the effect of impairing the
obligation of contract and accordingly in conflict with Arti-
"There is little basis for this contention of Appellee. Section 230 of
the Act taxes all investment income (all income not excluded as income
by definition) at 6%. Then a credit of 2'% on all proper deductions is
allowed. The result is that a 3 % tax is imposed on the deductions(supposedly allowed absolutely by Section 224 of the Act). As "taxes
paid" is among the items deductible, it follows that the investment in-
come taxpayer must pay 3,%% on all other taxes paid. As applied to the
income beneficiary of a trust, this particular feature of the Act is most
objectionable. See 8upra circa notes 29-37.
51 See Redfield v. Fisher, 135 Ore. 180, 292 P. 813 (1930), where it was
declared that the fact that the tax there questioned was a gross income
tax was persuasive evidence that it was not an income tax at all but a
property tax.
5Mr. Randolph L. Cockey, President of The Taxpayers' Relief Asso-
ciation, Inc., reports that several such cases have been brought to his
attention. One of a particularly trying nature, he gives the facts of as
follows: Mr. A., anelderly single gentleman, received total income in 1939
of $1500, all from ground rents and securities. During that same tax-
able period, Mr. A's business showed a net loss of $1600, the result be-
ing that Mr. A showed a net loss for the year of $100. Under the Income
Tax Act Mr. A's investment income would be taxed at 6% (tax would
thus be $90); Mr. A would be allowed to deduct 2%% of $1600, or $40,
and in addition would be allowed a tax credit of $25; the result would
be that Mr. A paid a tax of $25 when in fact during 1939 Mr. A lost
$100.
59 Taxes on gross receipts have been sustained. See Jones v. Gordy,
169 Md. 173, 180 A. 272 (1935). The Indiana gross income tax has also
been upheld as to income actually reaching Indiana. But see Adams v.
Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 82 L. Ed. 1368, 58 S. Ct. 913 (1937).
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cle 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States,
this point was not stressed either below or on appeal 60
The Appellee contended that this Section could be con-
strued as applicable only to such contracts as were entered
into after the effective date of the Act and that as to these
contracts the Section was constitutional.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals states in terse lan-
guage that the effect of this Section is to impair the obli-
gation of contract, and that accordingly the Section is in
conflict with Article 1, Section 10 of the United States
Constitution." The point made by Appellee is not dis-
cussed.
Comparison of the More Generally Discussed Features of
the Maryland Classified Income Tax Act with
Income Tax Statutes of Other States
It has been contended by many of the critics of the
Maryland Income Tax Act that no other state has an in-
come statute even remotely resembling the Maryland Act.
How unique in the field of income taxation is this Classified
Income Tax?
Prior to the depression years few states levied general
personal (as distinguished from corporate) income taxes,
but at the present time the state income tax is no longer
an oddity: thirty-two states and the District of Columbia
now have some form of general personal income tax.62
0 It was not considered to be of importance in a controversy between a
taxpayer and the State.
01 The rule is that when the constitutionality of a statute is assailed,
if the statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one
of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other it would be valid,
it is the plain duty of the court to adopt that construction which will
save the statute from constitutional infirmity. See WILLOUGHBY, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 34.
02 Included are (the dates listed after the states in parenthesis are those
dates on which the present form of income tax was enacted, prior forms
of income taxes having existed in many cases) ; Alabama (1935), Ari-
zona (1933), Arkansas (1937), California (1935), Colorado (1937), Dela-
ware (1929), District of Columbia (1939), Georgia (1933), Idaho (1932),
Indiana (1933), Iowa (1935), Kansas (1933), Kentucky (1936), Louisiana
(1934), Maryland (1939) Massachusetts (1916), Minnesota (1933), Mis-
sissippi (1934), Missouri (1929), Montana (1933), New Mexico (1933),
New York (1919), North Carolina (1939), North Dakota (1913), Okla-
homa (1935), Oregon (1930), South Carolina (1932), South Dakota (1939),
Utah (1933) Vermont (1933) Virginia (1926), West Virginia (1935),
Wisconsin (1935). In addition, two states, New Hampshire (1923) and
Tennessee (1931), have income taxes of a special character. New Hamp-
shire levies a tax on income in the form of interest and dividends at
the same rate as is levied upon other property throughout the state.
Tennessee levies a tax on the income in the form of interest and divi-
dends at the rate of 6% (unless 75% of the property of the corporation
paying the interest or dividend is taxable in Tennessee, In which event
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The great majority of these states have adopted the gradu-
ated form of tax as opposed to the classified-as-to-source
or flat forms, with respect to individuals. Only three states
have adopted a general personal income tax of the classi-
fied variety, and only one state has adopted a general per-
sonal income tax of the flat character."3 However, the ma-
jority of states impose income taxes on corporations at
flat rates. 4
In those twenty-eight states and the District of Colum-
bia, which impose a graduated personal income tax, the
graduations range from 1% to 15%,65 but few states use
the same scale of graduations or even have the same mini-
mum and maximum rates. The flat rates on corporate in-
comes range from 2% to 7%.6 In addition to those four
the rate is only 4%). In 1931 a general income tax of a graduated char-
acter was passed in Tennessee but it was held unconstitutional (Evans
v. McCabe, 164 Tenn. 672, 52 S. W. (2d) 159 (1932)).
63 Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted the
graduated form of tax for individuals. Following is a list of those states with
graduated income taxes and the amount of the graduations: Alabama (1 %
to 5%), Arizona (1% to 5%), Arkansas (1% to 5%), California (1% to 15%),
Colorado (1% to 6%, plus an additional flat surtax on dividends and in-
terest), Delaware (1% to 3%), District of Columbia (1% to 3%), Georgia(1% to 7%), Idaho (1Y2% to 8%), Kansas (1% to 4%), Kentucky (2%
to 5%), Louisiana (2% to 6%), Minnesota (1% to 10%), Mississippi
(3% to 8%), Missouri (1% to 4%), Montana (1% to 4%), New Mex-
ico (1% to 4%), New York (2% to 7%, plus an additional 1% flat emer-
gency tax for 1940; different graduated scale for capital gains), North
Carolina (3% to 7%), North Dakota (1% to 15%), Oklahoma (1% to 9%),
Oregon (2% to 7%, plus an additional flat surtax on interest and divi-
dents), South Carolina (2% to 5%, plus an additional graduated surtax
on interest and dividends), South Dakota (1% to 8%), Utah (1% to
5%), Virginia (1Y2% to 3%), West Virginia (1% to 4%), Wisconsin
(1% to 7%, plus an additional surtax for 1940).
Three states have adopted the classified-as-to-source form of tax: In-
diana (the rates vary from 14% to 1%; see Note 67, infra) ; Maryland(the rates vary from 21/2% to 6%; see page 2, supra) ; and Massachusetts(the rates vary from 11% to 6%; see Note 67, infra).
One state, Vermont, has adopted a flat income tax (2%), subject, how-
ever, to an additional surtax on interest and dividends (see Note 67,
infra).
1, Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia levy flat income
taxes on corporations: Alabama (3%), Arkansas (2%), California (4%),
Colorado (4%), District of Columbia (5%), Georgia (5Y2%), Iowa (2%),
Kansas (2%), Kentucky (4%), Louisiana (4%), Maryland (1 %), Mass-
achusetts (21/2%), Minnesota (6%), Missouri (2%), Montana (3%, with
a $5 minimum), New Mexico (2%), North Carolina (6%), Oklahoma
(6%), Oregon (8%, with a $10 minimum), South Carolina (4%%), Ten-
nessee (3.75%), Utah (3%), Virginia (3%). The above percentage fig-
ures denote the rate of tax taken from the latest reports, but since
these rates are constantly fluctuating, the rates given above may not all
be accurate. In addition these rates do not take into account the cred-
its given in certain instances by the various states for one reason or
another. Only three states have graduated corporation income taxes:
Arizona (1%-5 /l%), North Dakota (3%-6%), and Wisconsin (2%-6%).
See supra n. 63.
88 See supra n. 64.
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states which do not graduate the rates on individual in-
comes, 7 there are two states which levy a special income
tax on income in the form of interest and dividends.6 8
In all states where the net income tax is general in char-
acter personal exemptions are allowed. The most com-
mon amounts are $800 to $1000 for single persons or mar-
ried persons not living with spouse 9 and $2000 to $2500
for heads of families or married persons living with
spouse.70  Some states permit a deduction after the tax has
" Indiana imposes a classified gross income tax, the rates of which
vary depending upon the source of the income (this tax has so many
more characteristics of a gross receipts tax than an income tax that
it is usually classified by text-book writers in that category rather than
as an income tax) : (1) Display advertising at 11%; (2) Wholesalers and
Jobbers at 1 %; (3) Retailers at 1%; (4) Public Utilities and Banks at
1%; and (5) All other income at 1%.
Maryland is discussed herein.
Massachusetts imposes a classified income tax, the rates of which vary
depending upon the source of the income: (1) Interest and dividends at
6%; (2) Annuity Income at 1 %; (3) Excess of gains over losses from
the sale of intangible personal property at 3%; and (4) Business income
over $2000 at 1A%. For exemptions as to classes (1), (2), and (3),
see notes 69 and 70, inlra.
Vermont imposes a flat 2% rate on all income and adds a fiat 4% sur-
tax on income from stocks, bonds and annuities.
"See supra n. 62. Neither New Hampshire nor Tennessee levy an ad
valorem tax on intangible securities.
69 For single persons or married persons not living with spouse follow-
ing are the personal exemptions (or equivalent tax credits) allowed by
the various states:
One state allows $2000 exemption: Massachusetts (but as to Interest,
dividends, annuity Income and excess of gains over losses in the sale of
intangible personal property only $1000 exemption is allowed, and this
only if the entire income of the taxpayer is less than $1000).
Twenty states and the District of Columbia allow $1000 exemption:
Arizona (tax credit equivalent to), California, Colorado (2% surtax on
certain forms of investment Income without this personal exemption),
Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa (tax credit equivalent to), Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland (tax credit equivalent to, but not as to all forms
of income), Minnesota (tax credit equivalent to), Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina (only $500 personal
exemption on income in the form of interest and dividends), Vermont(only $400 personal exemption on income in the form of interest and
dividends), Virginia, and West Virginia.
One state allows $850 exemption: Oklahoma. Two states allow $800
exemption: Oregon (only $500 personal exemption on income in the
form of Interest and dividends) and Wisconsin. One state allows $750
exemption: Kansas. One state allows $700 exemption: Idaho. Two states
allow $600 exemption: South Dakota (tax credit equivalent to) and
Utah. One state allows $500 exemption: North Dakota.
In Tennessee and New Hampshire the tax is not general in nature but
is only on Income in the form of Interest and divIdends. In New Hamp-
shire a $200 exemption per person is allowed.
70 For heads of families or married persons living with spouse follow-
ing are the personal exemptions (or equivalent tax credits) allowed by
the various states:
Two states allow $3000 exemption: Alabama and Minnesota (tax credit
equivalent to).
Eleven states allow $2500 exemption: Arkansas, California, Colorado(2% surtax on certain forms of Investment income without exemptions),
[VOL. V
1940] INCOME TAX
been computed (a tax credit) in lieu of these exemptions.
For dependents an additional $300 to $400 exemption is
customary. 7
1
There is considerable uniformity among the income tax
statutes of the various states in respect to what constitutes
taxable income. As to residents, the tax is usually levied
upon their entire net income, regardless of source; as to
non-residents, the tax is usually levied upon that part of
their net incomes received from property owned or busi-
ness carried on in the state. As to corporations, the tax
is usually levied upon the entire net income, if domestic,
and upon the net income arising from property situated,
and business done, in the state, if foreign. "Net income" is
uniformly defined as "gross income" of the taxpayer less
the deductions allowed. However, the items includable
in "gross income" and the items deductible vary to a lim-
ited extent in the various states. Thus, almost all states
exclude the following from "gross income": (1) the pro-
ceeds of life insurance policies paid by reason of the death
of the insured, (2) amounts received under life insurance
or endowment contracts as a return of capital, (3) the value
District of Columbia, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts (but
as to interest, dividends, annuity income and excess of gains over losses
in the sale of intangible personal property, only $1500 exemption Is al-
lowed, and this only if the entire income of taxpayers is less than $1500),
Mississippi, New Mexico, and New York.
Eleven states allow $2000 exemption: Arizona (tax credit equivalent
to), Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland (tax credit equivalent to but
only as to ordinary income), Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Vermont
(only $400 per person exemption on income in the form of interest and
dividends), Virginia and West Virginia.
One state allows $1800 exemption: South Carolina (only $500 per per-
son exemption on income in the form of interest and dividends).
One state allows $1750 exemption: Wisconsin (tax credit equivalent to).
One state allows $1700 exemption: Oklahoma. Four states allow $1500 ex-
emption: Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota and Oregon (only $500 per per-
son exemption on income In the form of interest and dividends).
Two states allow $1200 exemption: South Dakota (tax credit equiva-
lent to) and Utah. See supra n. 69, as to Tennessee and New Hampshire.
71 For dependents following are the personal exemptions (or equivalent
tax credits) allowed by the various states:
Two states allow $500 exemption: Iowa (tax credit equivalent to) and
Minnesota (tax credit equivalent to).
Thirteen states allow $500 exemption: Alabama, Arizona (tax credit
equivalent to), Arkansas, California, Colorado (2% surtax on certain
forms of investment income without exemptions), District of Columbia,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland (tax credit exqulvalent to but
only as to ordinary income), Mississippi, New York, and Wisconsin.
Five states allow $300 exemption: Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon (not as
to income in the form of interest and dividends), Utah and West Virginia.
Two states allow $250 exemption: Massachusetts and Vermont.
Ten states allow $200 exemption: Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina (not as to
Income in the form of interest and dividends), South Dakota and Vir-
ginia. See supra n. 69, as to Tennessee, New Hampshire and Indiana.
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of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, inheritance
or succession, (4) amounts received through accident or
health insurance, (5) amounts received under Workmen's
Compensation or Employers' Liability Acts, (6) amounts
received by way of damages for personal injuries or prop-
erty damage, (7) income which the state is prohibited from
taxing under the Constitution of the United States, and
(8) interest upon the obligations of the State or its political
subdivisions.
It is uniformly recognized that certain deductions from
gross income (as defined by the various Acts) should be
allowed. Almost all states taxing net income in general
and not merely income from certain specific sources include
the following items among the deductions allowable: (1)
all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred dur-
ing the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
(2) all interest paid or accrued during the taxable year,
(3) taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year, except
against local benefits of a permanent nature, estate, inheri-
tance, succession, and gift taxes, (4) debts ascertained to
be worthless and charged off during the taxable year, (5)
reasonable amounts for depreciation and depletion, and
(6) charitable contributions (generally limited as to donees
and as to amount).
The vast majority of the state income taxes are based
on the net taxable income received by the taxpayer. Of
course, since "net income" and "gross income" are simply
what they are defined to be by the various statutes, it is
sometimes difficult to determine whether a tax is net or
gross, as the terms are generally understood. However,
there is only one general income tax of a "gross" charac-
ter among the state income tax laws, and that tax re-
sembles a sales tax more than it does an income tax.7 2 On
the other hand, several states do have general income taxes
which are gross as to income from a particular source.
Thus, Colorado levies a surtax of 2% on income in the
form of dividends from corporate stock, royalties, interest
from money, notes, credits, bonds and other securities, and
none of the deductions or personal exemptions allowed as
to general income apply as to this surtax income.73 Sev-
72 Indiana. Provision is made for the filing of quarterly reports, un-
less the amount of the tax is under $10. The rates of the tax vary as to
source of income. There are, however, personal exemptions allowed
by the Act. See supra n. 67.
71 Oregon and Vermont also place a surtax on income from certain
intangibles, which is gross in character. The Maryland Classified Income
Tax is gross in respect to investment income. See supra circa n. 55 ff.
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eral states which do not have a general income tax, but
which do have a tax on income received from certain in-
tangibles do not allow any deductions and are accordingly
"gross" in nature. 4
Conclusion
From this survey of the income taxes of other states
as compared with the Maryland Classified Income Tax cer-
tain conclusions may be reached concerning the Maryland
levy:
(1) The amounts of the tax exacted by the Maryland
Act from the pocket of the taxpayer in the low income
brackets are much larger than those exacted in the vast ma-
jority of the states. This is true both as to "ordinary in-
come"75 and as to "investment income", ' 6 and is due largely
to the fact that almost all states outside of Maryland have
a graduated form of tax, and the so-called "little man" un-
der such tax is not hit so hard.
(2) The personal exemptions allowed by the Mary-
land Act are about average as applied to "ordinary in-
come",7 7 but are considerably below average when applied
to "investment income",7s particularly in the ground rent
income class. 9
(3) The gross income tax feature of the Maryland Act,
though not without some precedent in other states, is al-
most unique in the manner of its application under a gen-
eral income tax statute."0
(4) Certain classifications under the Maryland Act re-
sult in the placing of unreasonable tax burdens on certain
"1 Tennessee levies a 6% tax on income in the form of dividends and
interest (4% where 75% of the property of the corporation paying the
dividend or interest is taxable in Tennessee). There are certain exclu-
sions but no deductions and personal exemptions. The tax is in effect
an intangible property tax. New Hampshire levies a similar tax, but
$200 of such income is exempt.
" In only two states, Mississippi and North Carolina, is the minimum
rate of tax for ordinary Income (as defined in the Maryland Act) over 2%.
" As to interest and dividends, some states which levy a general in-
come tax, notably Colorado, Oregon, South Carolina and Vermont, exact
a rather large amount of tax from the taxpayer in the low income tax
brackets, but in no case does it seem to be as great as is exacted by the
Maryland Act. It is interesting to note that in Massachusetts, one of the
earliest states to adopt a classified income tax, an exemption of $1000
is allowed the recipient of this form of income. See 8upra notes 69-70.
As the Maryland type of ground rent is almost unique, a comparison
of the Maryland 6% tax on ground rent income with income taxes of
other states would be of little use. See supra, n. 55.
' See 8upra notes 69, 70 and 71.
• See supra notes 69, 70, 71 and 76.
79 See Ibid.
" See supra notes 67 and 72.
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forms of income of the same general class as other forms
of income on which such unreasonable burdens are not
placed. It is submitted that a particularly glaring example
of this is found in the classification of ground rent income
as "investment income" and of ordinary rent from real
estate as "ordinary income"."'
(5) The Maryland Act is in the form of the classified
variety which, though not a form untried in other juris-
dictions, is nevertheless comparatively seldom found,
largely due to the fact that it is generally felt that the
graduated net income tax is more closely geared to ability
to pay than the classified income tax.8 2
The conclusion is inescapable from a study of income
tax laws of other states that, generally speaking, the Mary-
land Act is not in harmony with other state income tax
statutes. Most income taxes are levied on the theory that
those best able to contribute to the support of the govern-
ment should be those most heavily taxed. The powers re-
sponsible for the Maryland Act seem to have lost sight of
this cardinal principle of income taxation in their effort to
discard the intangible property tax and "soak" the ground
rent owner. It is submitted that radical modifications of
the Maryland Act along the lines suggested are in order.8 8
THE VESTING OF REMAINDERS AND
THEIR ALIENABILITY
Bishop v. Horney'
Hans v. Sale Deposit & Trust Co.2
In the first principal case the testatrix devised certain
realty to her three daughters for life with remainders to
their issue, but in event of the death of any daughter with-
out issue her share should go to the surviving daughters or
daughter, with a gift over in event of the death of all three
daughters without issue. There was also a provision that
should any daughter leave a child surviving at the time
of her death, but the child should die before reaching the
81 See supra n. 55.
"See supra circa n. 55 ff.
"The Tax Revision Commission of 1939 is scheduled to file a report
with the Governor on or before December 1st, 1940, recommending modifi-
cations in the Act.
1177 Md. 353, 9 A. (2d) 597 (1939).
'12 A. (2d) 208 (Md. 1940).
[VOL. V
